The Lucky Country Syndrome in Australia: Resources, Social Democracy, and Regimes of Development in Historical Political Economy Perspective [1]

Christopher Lloyd

School of Business, Economics and Public Policy
University of New England, Australia
and
Nordic Centre of Excellence on the Nordic Welfare State (Nordwel)
Helsinki University, Finland

Email: chris.lloyd@une.edu.au

Paper presented to 5th Uruguay Economic History Conference,
Montevideo, November 2011

FIRST (INCOMPLETE) DRAFT, November 2011.

---

[1] This evolving paper, still an incomplete work in progress, is in the spirit of the critical realist socio-political-economy tradition of historical research into past and present of Karl Polanyi, Albert Hirschman, and Barrington Moore, a tradition that was eclipsed some decades ago by rational choice, ahistorical, political economy, but which still has much to offer. Polanyi's rejection of economic abstractionism and his conceptualization of the formal/substantive distinction seems to me to be essential to the study of long-run socio-economic history. Attempts to understand the present crisis of the world economy could do worse than adopt the interdisciplinary outlook of Polanyi and of Hirschman, neither of whom could ever have been pigeon-holed into a single box such as economic development theorist or political theorist or economic historian. Hirschman's attempts to understand the complexities of macro-social processes over time showed an exemplary skepticism about simplistic models and spurious quantification of over-aggregate variables, and a constant concern to study the local specifics of cases within a theoretical framework that rejected the abstraction of the economy from culture, society, and politics. Similarly, Moore was a theorist and historian of routes to modernity who was concerned with the intersection of social and political systems in producing alternative routes to economic development. An approach in the tradition of these thinkers focuses on the role of social classes, the state, and policy in the process of socio-economic change and development. In particular, the concept of the 'developmental state' is now an essential component of theorizing the comparative history of commodity-dependent countries as much as of other types of countries, such as those in the Nordic region and in East Asia.

Are There Lucky and Unlucky Countries?

In 2005 the Uruguayan football team went to Australia for the final play-off match for qualification for the 2006 World Cup, having won the home leg 1:0. It's history that Australia won the Sydney match 1:0 and then the subsequent penalty shootout in order to qualify. In the day or two that followed the Uruguayans had to go home to face the disappointed country. A coach or a fan was then recorded at Sydney airport as saying in effect that this didn't mean much for Australia but it meant everything to Uruguay because, "in Australia you have everything but in Uruguay we have only football". Of course we understand that this is not literally true but we can interpret the emotional and material basis of what he meant as arising in part from the gap in living standards that opened over the course of the past century. We could also interpret him to mean that in Uruguay, a country today of only 3.5 million people (with a GDP per capita PPP of about $14000), can only hope to be world-class at one main men's sport and so it makes sense, in a comparative advantage sense, to specialize on football. They have done so with spectacular success despite the hiccup in 2005. In Australia (GDP p/c $40,000 PPP), on the other hand, with a population of 22 million, which is still not large, there is a continental, eclectic, and non-strategic attitude and so all sports are played, including four forms of football and many other team sports, to about an equally high world standard. Furthermore, the most popular form of football is home-grown and not played anywhere else because it hasn't been exported. It's protected! The case of New Zealand is also interesting here. With a population of only 4.4 million (GDP p/c $27,000) they too have specialized, as a deliberate government policy, on rugby and have long been the best in the world. While Uruguay has a football culture and New Zealand has a rugby culture, Australia has a sports culture.

The sport/standard of living nexus and comparison is not just a light hearted and irrelevant point but tells us something about the economic and social history of these comparable settler societies and their differing developmental experiences. Their historical experience is that economic (and social) development has been 'unbalanced' (in Albert Hirschman's (1958) terminology), to a greater or lesser extent, and heavily skewed towards commodity exports but that has not necessarily meant that they could not achieve developed, more balanced, modern societies. Part of the explanation for the differing experiences is the differing factor endowments but that cannot get us very far. A simple materialist explanation is more or less meaningless without a socio-institutional-historical argument to frame it.[2] Another way to put it is that luck or good fortune has to be made rather than simply waited for. 'Luck' is too limited a concept, of course, because national 'good fortune' is a complex mixture of endowments, investments, institutions, and, moreover, contingent historical events and processes.

A rich material factor endowment, or, more precisely, a dominance of commodity production, such as agricultural, mineral, or energy dependence, can lead to very uneven development and severe policy distortions and/or dysfunctional states, as the literature on resource curse tries to show. On the other hand, there have been marked successes of resource-based development. Furthermore, that a country's development process is always uneven and unbalanced has been recognized by economic historians ever since Adam Smith's observations of the unevenness of Scottish development in the mid-to-late 18th Century, and was a central proposition in Hirschman's (1958) theory of development. Regional, industrial, sectoral, and class imbalances exist everywhere but in the early stages and during the process of development these differences are much more marked than in an economically mature and modernized, societies. Of course, these imbalances are incompatible ultimately with modernization in the long-run for they can lead to political violence and dislocation.[3] The problem has long been understood, in some theoretical traditions at least, as one of how to achieve national growth and development in an unbalanced way, at least to begin with. The variety of success and failure of 'unbalanced countries' (most of which are former colonies or quasi-colonies in achieving development and modernization over the past century, despite great variations in their factor endowments, should lead to skepticism about the value of resource curse theorizing to

---

[2] Such an argument – that material conditions, including labour and capital supply – have been very important, within an institutional framework, in the comparative history of the settler societies, has been made in Lloyd (2012)

[3] The rapid development of China is repeating this pattern with very large imbalances now between development and standard of living in urban and rural areas and coastal and hinterland regions. But the rapidity and scale of transformation and the possibility of massive migration, the largest in history, is perhaps the largest case of 'the great transformation' ever experienced, greater even than the North Atlantic in the late 19th to early 20th centuries. Whether and how the economic transformation will result in socio-political modernization is becoming one of the great questions of our time. That other East Asian cases did so, not always peacefully, is significant.

explain the variations. And good fortune in the senses of unpredicted, contingent, events and outcomes, such as mineral and energy discoveries, lack of natural disasters, and enlightened leadership, could have a little to do with it but not decisively so. On the other hand, it might be considered that Australia has had a good 'accident of history' to be a small-to-medium sized population inhabiting a whole continent with all its natural resources. But there are other cases of that kind of land-resource/population ratio that have not been so successful.

Australia as a 'Lucky Country' in Global Perspective: The Centrality of a Developmental State

The value, then, of the ironic concept of 'the lucky country'[4] is that it not only focuses attention on the developmental significance of commodity wealth in the particular Australian historical context but also its relevance to other similar societies that have experienced commodity dependence. Australia is not the only lucky country, in either the neutral or ironic senses of the term. On the other hand, there may well have been comparatively unlucky countries when viewed through a world-wide and historical perspective on commodity dependence. Commodity dependence, according to the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, is supposed to lead to long-term relative decline because of the long-term term adverse terms of trade problem. But studying the short and long-run economic, social, and political effects of commodity dependence in any national context of the past two centuries or so is not simply a matter of examining the negative effects of terms of trade or sudden natural resource booms *a la* 'Dutch disease' or 'resource curses'. The literature on booming sectors, Dutch disease, and resource curse/blessing is often too over-generalised, too ahistorical, and focused too

[4] The term 'The Lucky Country' was coined by Donald Horne in 1964 to describe, in an ironic and critical manner, the syndrome whereby Australia remained rich due to successive waves of resource discoveries, which had the effect of always postponing the motivation and will to reform institutions, policies, and attitudes, and which was, therefore, in his eyes, an industrially, socially, and politically backward in the early 60s. In other words, the 'luck' of constant resource windfalls was not luck at all but a stultifying influence that hindered progress. Nevertheless, he understood that Australia was a wealthy country but one squandering its wealth, in his eyes. Forty years later (Horne 2004) he saw that significant change had occurred in the direction he hoped for. From today's perspective we can see that Horne's analysis was superficial and lacking in theoretical and scientific analysis but nevertheless was perceptive about what we would now call 'resource curse'. A similar argument has recently been made by Paul Cleary (2011), trying to update Horne's classic, with a similar journalistic and un-rigorous tenor, explicitly emphasizing what he takes to be resource curse and proposing policies to overcome it.

much on cursed cases rather than blessed cases to capture the full complexity of these phenomena and their effects. [5] Furthermore, being commodity dependent is not the same as experiencing a new booming sector. Booming sectors can, sooner or later, collapse or they can stabilize at a new structural normality.[6]

A historical political economy perspective, and one, moreover, that also takes into account social, cultural, and ideological developments, focuses attention on wider issues than just economic factors in abstraction from the rest of the historical-societal context and focuses on actual historical conditions and experiences of particular societies. And such a more inclusive (less abstract) approach should also go beyond the New Institutionalist perspective for it too misses essential social and cultural elements in this complex history. [7]

Commodity dependence is actually fundamental to the entire history of economic and social development for, after all, just about every country and society has at some stage been 'commodity dependent' in a general sense of reliance on commodity production as the foundation of the economy and also the export profile.[8] The history of the earliest economically developing countries and regions – Britain and the Low Countries and later the Rhine, Baltic, and New England regions – was one of commodity dependence at the earliest stages of growth, whether it was wool, fish,

---

[5] The seminal Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) contributions have been something of a 'curse' on the debate because of the lack of a long-term perspective going back to the 19th Century and their focus on the poorest countries. Moreover, an approach that uses only aggregated, short-term data and regression analyses of supposedly purely quantifiable variables is bound to miss what could be some fundamentally important factors, such as local power structures, formal and informal institutions, ethnic conflicts, cultures, corruption, criminality, and so on, most of which are below the radar of the Harvard economist who does not leave his office to actually study the real human, historically evolved, forces at work in local places. Orthodox economics does not provide, in my view, the best approach to historical questions of socio-economic experience and change in the long-run. Furthermore, the Dutch Disease phenomenon, which, actually, turned out to be not a lasting illness but one which The Netherlands and later the UK overcame quite quickly, is very specifically the result of a booming new commodity export sector (such as oil and gas) within an already industrially mature advanced economy. Such specificity means the phenomenon is not actually found in traditional commodity-exporting economies that have always been commodity-dependent.

[6] Stabilization seems to be the case with Australia in 2011. That is, the boom phase might have passed and now there is a new stability at a much higher level of mineral and energy exports, a higher terms of trade, and a higher exchange rate. This is the longer-term experience of some other commodity dependent economies, such as Norway and the Middle Eastern oil exporters.

[7] New Institutionalism, deriving from the work of Douglass North, is too imbued with the Rational Choice and Public Choice nostrums to capture the real complexities of the substantive structures of power, decision-making, and collective behaviour.

[8] Edward Barbier's extensive work has developed this argument. Cf Barbier 2011.

marine animal oil, forestry, coal, minerals, meat and animal products, or grain. Indeed, as the transformative process of economic growth and development has spread around the world from the 18th Century it has often begun from a foundation in commodity exports. Over time, the central issue always became, of course, of how to achieve diversification, greater efficiency, and sectoral change in order to achieve ongoing development, prosperity, and modernization. And, furthermore, *developmental* success or failure has always been more than the achievement or absence high average incomes per capita (cf Sen, 1999, Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi 2009, HDI 2011). There have been many cases of high average incomes per capita from resource wealth that have not led to development and modernization.[9] The resource curse can, of course, take many forms, including persistent widespread poverty in the face of seeming plenty and high average incomes but lack of human social and political development, especially in post-colonial contexts. [10]

Even a casual observation of the political, institutional, social, and cultural consequences of long-term primary export dependence, including booms and busts, in some developed countries, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, reveals that it has indeed been possible to ride the commodities roller coaster to beneficial effect with industrial-modernization outcomes,[11] despite the prevalence in many places at certain times of resource squatting, rent seeking, and cartelisation. Importantly, the countries listed above

---

[9] One of the most notorious and saddest cases is that of Nauru, which for a time had one of the highest incomes per capita from its phosphate exports but is now a completely failed society and state. More pertinent are several oil-rich exporters with very high average incomes but low socio-political development. Cf HDI 2011.

[10] The conclusion by Easterly and Levine (2003) of their econometric study of endowments, tropics, and germs, among many other factors, is a telling one: "These kinds of cross-country results are only a beginning to telling the story of colonial experiences, political conflict and consensus, institution-building, and economic development for each unique case. Still, we are struck by the way that endowments and policies have no independent effect once we control for institutions, contrary to a number of stories, and that institutional quality seems to be a sufficient statistic for accounting for economic development." Of course what they could have added is that, in turn, institutional quality is itself the result of the long-run historical experience of each unique case, especially during the European colonial era that affected the whole world and had such a long-lasting and often quite damaging effect on most of the LDCs today. Furthermore, institutions are certainly not unchanging, including in the poorest LDCs, and that process is itself a consequence of the unique experience of each country, albeit within an increasingly globalised context.

[11] The UN HDI has consistently ranked Australia, Norway, Canada, and Finland at the top. The OECD's *How's Life Index* has Australia in first place, closely followed by Canada, if all eleven variables are rated equally. Various other international rankings (some more objective than others) of countries and cities always have Australia at or near the top in terms of quality of life.

comprise two distinctive groups – Anglo Settler societies, and Nordic societies – both of which shared in the 19th and early 20th centuries the important characteristics of resource abundance, social egalitarianism, relative labour scarcity, and emergent-to-actual democratic constitutions. Moreover, they all developed, out of this background, versions of a developmental state that was able, as an institutional structure, to engineer the transition from commodity dependence to modernization. Why and how such a state emerged in these countries and why it couldn't in other cases is a basic question. (cf Auty 2002) And why such a state then successfully developed in other advanced societies, not always peacefully, such as most of Western Europe, Japan, and now the rest of East Asia, is part of the larger problematic.[12]

The Anglo Settler and Nordic regions seem to have little in common with other groups of commodity-dependent countries in the 21st Century, such as the African oil-exporting LDCs (eg Angola, Nigeria), the Middle Eastern oil exporters (eg Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE), and Russia and Central Eurasian (eg Azerbaijan, Kazahkstan) oil and gas exporters. Thus when the long-run, world-wide, history of commodity-dependence and the successes and failures of transformations to prosperous modernization is viewed as a whole (ie, actually the economic history of the world during the past several centuries), it's very obvious that over-generalised theory and inappropriate comparisons have been roadblocks to a better understanding of the experiences of particular groups of countries and individual countries. Many commodity exporters did make the transformation to modernity and high human development. Many LDC commodity-dependent countries are continuing to make that transformation, such as Malaysia, Chile, Uruguay, Mauritius, Botswana, and Indonesia (perhaps). Thus the historical picture is one of both contrast and similarity such that certain generalisations can be made but only within a context that takes complexity, uniqueness, and comparison seriously. Reliance on a rational/institutionalist, public choice and governance approach is not very helpful (cf Robinson 2009 for an example), because it often avoids the very question it should be

---

12 Most likely the spread of a SDWC regime to all advanced capitalist economies during the second half of the 20th century was a product of a combination of institutional transmission and more fundamental socio-political processes originating in mature democratic societies. (cf Lloyd 2011)

trying to answer through a historical analysis of why there is good governance or its lack.

Thus, key to understanding the current economic situation in Australia and elsewhere is to see the significance of the forces that determined the evolution of its political and social institutions in the long-run, particularly the emergence of a ‘developmental state’ ideology and organisation from the early 20th Century. This grew out of the combination of the cultural and institutional inheritance and historical experience of the Australian settler process. The contingent intersection of British imperial influence and institutional framework (including Liberalism), the natural resource endowment, the indigenous presence and response, and the peculiar Australian settler colonization process, resulted by the early 20th Century in a home-grown and pioneering form of Social Democratic Welfare Capitalism (SDWC) that had an agenda of economic diversification and modernization and which has more or less survived until the 21st Century. This form of capitalism has morphed through several regimes since the late19th century but has retained certain key elements. Whether this political economy can survive the current resource boom is the subject of much current debate, addressed at the end of this paper.

Commodity Dependence and Development in the Long-Run: The Importance of Linkages and Political Embeddedness

The resource/commodities curse argument can be summarized by the following propositions:

The flow of export income from a rich commodity sector has the potential to cause fundamental distortions in economy, society, and government and a failure of development because:

(i) Distortion of economic sectoral investment and employment – over-concentration in the resource export sector at the expense of other sectors, especially agriculture and import replacing manufacturing. A very unbalanced economy results if the state is unable to redirect investment to other sectors.

(ii) The distortion is caused partly by exchange rate effects casused by the high income-earning export sector

(iii) The flow of export income via taxation causes rent seeking, corruption, and criminality in the government sector, reducing state capacity to provide infrastructure and developmental assistance to other sectors. A rentier state can result that is captured by self-enriching elites who have no interest in national development.

(iv) The over-dependence on a single or small number of commodity exports makes the country vulnerable to price shocks because commodity prices are highly volatile.

(v) Ultimately, a resource export economy is vulnerable to the long-term terms of trade problem.

Five closely interconnected forces seem to be crucial in determining whether a commodity-dependent exporting country is characterized by resource curse or is able to avoid the problem to achieve a balanced developmental outcome. The history and situation of each state today is a consequence of this matrix of forces and a good understanding can only be head by examining all of them together. The relative influence of each differs in every case.

(i) The political and governance framework (including ideologies and cultures) that were inherited and have evolved from the distant past;

(ii) The material foundations of particular commodities, which affect the types and strength of linkages they have with the rest of the economy and society;

(iii) The strength of the linkages of particular commodities to the wider national and world economy;

(iv) The global context of economic regimes, policies, and geopolitics, and their ideological justifications;

(v) Contingent historical events and processes within each polity, colony, nation, and state.

Democratisation, liberalization, and the transparent rule of law are essential for they are the only political framework that is more or less certain to prevent overwhelming corruption in the long run. The power of corruption in today's interlinked world is far greater than in earlier times.[13] 'Benign' dictatorships have never succeeded in eliminating corruption and have always declined into a cycle of rent-seeking, inequality, violent repression, and lack of dynamism or were forced to give way to democratic forces that enabled transparency and rule-of-law. In the early modern era of the 19th Century it is noteworthy that those commodity-dependent countries that succeeded in transformative economic and social modernization did so within a framework of liberalizing constitutions and emergent democracy. Civic engagement became possible and this in turn began to act as a break on corruption and rent-seeking by elites. Such a political context then enabled class pressure towards the establishment of a democratic developmental state and one, moreover, that engendered consensus about the possible nexus between growth, development, equality, and social welfare. Emergence of such a consensus – a historic compromise around a 'win-win' strategy rather than an ongoing class struggle – was highly successful in producing versions of a distinct form of Social Democratic Welfare Capitalism (Lloyd 2011).

A developmental state is essentially one in which democratic pressure from below and/or elite-driven policies from above are directed towards national economic development rather than just elite rent-seeking, corruption, and class exploitation, as was the norm for most of civilizational history. Of course corruption can go hand-in-hand for a time with a developmental state that is not fully democratic or transparent. That has clearly been the case in many instances, notably Nazi Germany in the 1930s, the Soviet Union in the interwar decades, Peron's Argentina, and Pinochet's Chile, Park's South Korea. But these were highly unstable situations and did not endure. CP-ruled China today is also increasingly unstable.

However, a developmental state cannot by itself guarantee the transformation of a commodity-dependent country or region. Economic linkages have to be possible and then institutionally fostered. Not all commodities are alike in their linkages to their

[13] Arbjorensen (2011) quotes disturbing data from African Union and UN sources to the effect that 25% of GDP is wasted in Africa each year through corruption; and illicit outflows from the global south amount to 1.3 trillion dollars or more each year. Most of these illicit flows are to the benefit of developed countries through their banking, property, and consumption systems. Banking privacy in developed countries is partly to blame.

wider economic contexts. The Innis/Hirschman[14] theory shows that the macroeconomic affects of particular staples or commodities are quite different, depending, *ceterus paribus* institutionally, on their material, technological, and employment nature. Energy exports are quite different in terms of their backward, forward, and final demand linkages from agriculture, base metals, forestry, and fishing. And the backward and forward linkages from economically leading commodity sectors – commodity extraction, production and exports – are always significantly different from those from other leading sectors of manufacturing and services. Final demand linkages effects are also crucial – these depend on distribution of income, general wage levels, and consumption patterns, which in turn are strongly effected by the institutionalization of the labour market.

Thus commodity dependence has certain basic effects on the structure of a domestic economy and society. Nevertheless, the strengths of these linkages and their potential for promoting development do depend, in turn, on institutional frameworks. For example, wheat export industries in Australia, Canada, and Mid-West USA in the 19th Century all had strong backward linkages to industrial development and strong final demand linkages to consumption patterns compared to those in Argentina and Poland. These differing linkages were the product of socio-institutional contexts in these regions and global geopolitical contexts affecting these regions. Land ownership patterns (independent family farmers versus tenants or serfs on large estates) were crucial as were regulated imperial trading connections, financial institutions, and merchant networks. The stimulation of farm machinery manufacturing in Australia, Canada, and Midwest USA in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries was instrumental in laying the foundations for industrial development in these places (Meyer 2010), thanks in part to protection of manufacturing. This development was also supported by the final demand linkage in the sense of the provision of an ever-cheaper food supply to urban areas due the technological revolutions in agriculture.

Another example is of the forestry products sector in Sweden and Finland in the 19th and early 20th Century, in which strong backward linkages to machinery

---

[14] Harold Innis (1930) and Albert Hirschman (1958) developed the linkages argument in different ways. Innis' staple theory showed how export commodities linked with the wider economy and Hirschman took this further in a political economy perspective.

manufacturing developed. The Nokia company example is of one instance of this backward linkage effect of a forestry company leading to the emergence over time of a major industrial conglomerate that then concentrated on high tech manufacturing in the late 20th Century.

Because of their seeming promise of riches but checked history, 'unbalanced' commodity-exporting countries have been perhaps the most effected by one or other of the two main ideological frameworks of development policy[15] that have influencing policy in for most of the past century or more: (a) *laissez faire / free trade*, leading to specialization on grounds of comparative advantage, enabling high commodity productivity and dynamic efficiency, but with *unavoidable backwardness* in non-exporting sectors; or (b) *diversification through import replacement,* with wide-based self-sufficiency, state promotion of industrial development and growth of an urban middle class, through protection of industries, but with *unavoidable inefficiency* and probable gradual national comparative decline. How to steer a line between these equally unrealistic ideologies has been a chief task for policy makers. [16]

Protectionist import-replacement and some form of active market interventionism was the preferred policy of almost all countries from the middle of the 19th Century until the 1950s or even as late as the 1980s in some cases, but that gave way in the 1980s to neo-liberal inspired free-marketisation and globalisation, leading supposedly to specialization through comparative advantage and elimination of rent-seeking from state elites, a policy that was hoped would not only achieve higher growth but permit the benefits of greater (but specialized) trade to spread somehow through the wider society. Nevertheless, despite the ideological shift, much protectionism remained, even in the advanced heartlands of the world economy. For commodity dependent exporters the effect of the neo-liberal strategy depended in turn depended on the strength of local institutions and the capacity to compete in the global trading system, a system, moreover, in which there were still many distortions and forms of

---

[15] These are rightly called ideologies rather than theories for they are ex-cathedra-type statements of a quasi-philosophical kind that express *a priori* faith rather than inductively-derived general concepts of causal connections

[16] A rich commodity export industry, such as wool, wheat, gold, oil, coal, iron ore, or gas, has always been a magnet for ambitious politicians and other elites who wish to engineer national and/or personal outcomes.

protectionism, especially through agricultural subsidies in advanced countries and currency manipulation. State protectionist policy has long-used such measures.

Indeed, one of the foundational components of policy ever since 'economic growth policy' (rather than just mercantilism) was first seen to be a task of governments from the early 19th Century, was currency regulation. Manipulations of metallic standards did enable governments to debase currencies until the more or less universal adoption of the gold standard in the late 19th century. This era of stable and fixed currency values and then the adoption of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates from the late 1940s, following the unregulated monetary turmoil of the interwar period, enabled governments to pursue protectionist policies within a developmental state agenda. Once the Bretton Woods system dissolved and was replaced with a supposedly free trade system of purely fiat currencies, widespread from the 1980s, the 'self-adjustment' mechanism was supposed to prevent protectionist policies and enable commodity exporters, in particular, to avoid inflationary pressures flowing from booming sectors or to make orderly, automatic, adjustments when booms collapsed. Of course not all countries have joined the free currency system[17] and, moreover, it has become quite clear that the international forex market follows its own cyclical and stochastic logic without a close correlation with the fortunes of individual economies. The naïve exchange rate theory of market-driven convergence according to international balance of payments and growth of particular economies has been shown to be delusional by the experience of real world financialisation and speculation in recent decades. All floated currencies are now open to speculation and several major currencies are now completely commoditised in the sense of being objects of trade and speculation more or less completely outside of the real economies that issue them.[18] Some countries have experimented with fixed exchange rates even during the post-Bretton Woods era, sometimes with spectacular failings (eg

[17] Even Switzerland, a supposed bastion of the free market ideology, has semi-pegged its currency to the Euro from September 2011.

[18] The Australian dollar is one of the most notorious examples, 97% of trades in which are for speculative/investment purposes. Currency trading requires volatility to be profitable, but volatility is detrimental to international trading in goods and services because of the added uncertainty and consequent risky necessity to hedge against price fluctuations due to currency fluctuations by many trading corporations, such as airlines.

Argentina's dollarization) and at other times with much success for a period, such as China's pegged RMB and Hong Kong's pegged dollar.

Currency regulation and state manipulation is a form of strategic intervention, which Hirschman argued for in 1958, as has Paul Krugman (1991, 1994) more recently, in his economic geography modeling approach. Central to both their theories is a concept of economic linkages. These linkages take the form of flows of capital investment, goods, labour, and profits between industries and sectors within an economy conceived as a complex web or structure of exchanges. This structure is held together by sets of social relations that are expressed as a combinations of formal contracts, informal social relations, social norms, networks of social power and relatedness, and ideational expressions of all these formal and informal exchanges.

The Innis/Hirschman/Krugman idea of linkages can be conceptually related to the Polanyian idea of embeddedness in the sense that economic relations, decisions, and behaviour are enveloped through linkages of a social relational kind such that the economic aspects take place within a larger social structure. The economy, in other words, is a *social* structure. This social structure is in part economic in its manifestation and socio-political in its framing of the context for economic exchange. Linkages of demand, supply, and investment between sectors take place within institutional structures that are enabled and developed by social and political networks and governance institutions. Institutions are rarely invented *de novo* but almost always evolve out of prior structures and contexts. The settler societies, those neo-Europes or fragments of the Old World, born in the early modern period, are somewhat exceptional in the sense that they were newborn societies but even they carried the definite marks of their parentage. This was certainly the case with Australia, born within the British Empire and its evolving institutional structure of the late 18th and early 19th Century, which had a profound effect on the subsequent history of the country.

Foundations of Australia: A Settler Capitalist Society with Special Characteristics

Colonial Australia was founded as an urban service colony for the British Empire, in the sense of a state-directed and controlled establishment of a prison. The role of the state was fundamental from the beginning. (Lloyd 2002, 2003) But a private entrepreneurial sector soon developed in a land of vast natural resources, beginning with seal and whale oil. Commodity dependence and export booms and busts have been a persistent feature of Australia's history ever since the late 18th Century. The category of 'commodities' includes agricultural, marine, mineral, and energy products and flows and collectively these have always been the dominant component of exports, rarely falling below 50% of the value of all exported goods and services and in 2011 constituting more than 67% (DFAT, 2011).

FIGURE 1



Furthermore, it can be argued that the ongoing primary export dependence has been key to Australia remaining in some respects as a settler society ever since European colonization in 1788 until the present. The settler legacy continues to dominate the economy and society and its politics and this has been the product, it is argued here, of the continuing commodity dependence. The reliance on immigration of skilled labour, the low household savings ratio (but high compulsory private pension savings), high propensity to consume, high capital import needs, high commodity export ratio, and the unresolved indigenous impoverishment and marginalization problem, are all continuing features.

Squatting is a further feature that is still significant. Settler society processes in most of the world from the 18th Century or earlier always had as a central dynamic the violent seizure and appropriation (or theft) of land and other resources, the monopolization of natural resources by the settler elite, a subsequent contestation for resource domination between these ruling elites and local and imperial states, a dependence henceforth on the export of commodities, and a consequent stunting of economic transformation towards modernization. Thus frontier squatting is fundamental to understanding these societies, not least Australia. What is in effect squatting continues to be a crucial element in Australia's mineral and energy export boom today in the form of the virulent opposition to state regulation and taxation by the large oligopolistic mineral and energy corporations. Reaping the benefits of monopoly rents have been the *raison d'etre* of squatter settler capitalists for centuries.

However, the other side of the 'Lucky Country' argument springs from the contingency of history for in spite of the power of the resource endowment and the other features of settlerism, including the atavistic squattocracy and the commodity export dependence, Australia did achieve economic and social modernization and was, indeed, for a time, a pioneer of the Social Democratisation of capitalism as a regulatory regime and developmental strategy. How could that have come about, especially when Australia is compared with some other settler regions?

The Political Economy of Australia 1788-1914: Emergence of an Effective Developmental State

Following the brief but spectacular marine oil era there was the 'pastoral age' of a rapidly expanding wool production economy, exploiting the natural grassland resource. The foundational *raison d'etre* and the subsequent resource expansion with imported capital contributed to the engendering of a largely urbanized, port-city, society. That society was fed by immigration from British middle class society with values of social mobility and a growing sense of egalitarianism. The fact that all of Australia (occupied by several British colonizing foundations) remained as elements of the British empire was significant for it meant that British Colonial Office policies drove the evolution of governance structures towards liberalization. Philosophic Radical/Wakefieldian ideas gained ascendancy in the Colonial Office by the early 1830s (Semmler 1961) and Chartist ideas were important among the immigrants arriving in the colonies. Wakefieldian systematic colonization was the central policy framework from the early1830s in NSW, South Australia, and later New Zealand. This policy met opposition among squatters and other atavistic elements in the colonies but by 1841 transportation of convicts to NSW ceased under the influence of liberal urban forces in Sydney and the atavistic frontier forces were eclipsed by the urban reformers. By the early 1840s the wool boom had collapsed. The depression of the early 1840s was a major turning point for not only were the political fortunes of the frontier defeated by the urban reformers but the wool producers lost economic power to the London-based merchants and banks(McMichael, 1984).

The 1840s were thus a major turning point for it marked the consolidation of an effective local state in each of the colonies, one that was able henceforth to build a different kind of socio-political structure, moving away from the influence of landed interests and towards a society of family farmers, urban industries, and promotion of middle class suburban life. The huge gold rushes from 1851 consolidated this emergent pattern and reinforced the push for liberal constitutions and electoral democracy. Once the gold began to decline in the 1860s political pressure grew for economic policies to promote employment and generate government revenue. The shift from laissez faire to protectionism was spreading around the world (except in Britain) and the Australian colonial dominions were no exception on the whole. New South Wales was an exception, remaining one of the few free trading regions in the world by the late 19th Century. This reflected the greater power of pastoral interests in the parliament and also the greater abundance of good land for sale to small farmers as the chief source (rather than import duties) of government revenue.

The era from 1851 to 1891 witnessed the emergence in Australia of an effective, liberal constitutional state with *de jure* and *de facto* democracy, thanks to universal malehood suffrage, secret ballots, and free and fair elections. This was crucial for what followed for the long, post-gold rush, mid-Victorian era of prosperity crashed in 1890-91 into a severe depression. The early 1890s crisis was fundamental for not only consolidating the local state structure but for the emergence of a new regime of capitalist regulation. The foundations for this regime were laid in the response to the depression and conflict of the early 90s, thanks to the strength of liberalism and labourism that had developed in the preceding decades.

Commodity Dependence and Regimes of Development Since 1914

The first decade of the 20th Century witnessed the development in Australia of a 'state experiment', as Reeves put in 1902, and which we should now call the development of a rudimentary form of Social Democratic Welfare Capitalism, the central interlinked institutions of which were the Court of Arbitration and the industrial protection policy. The Harvester Judgment of this Court in 1907 established the principle of 'wage justice' as being that 'fair and reasonable wages' for workers in a 'civilised society' were measured by family needs rather than capacity to pay or market conditions. Employers in the already large public sector adopted the principle and firms in the emerging manufacturing sector (the sector was about 12% of GDP in 1910) that wanted tariff protection had to pass on the implied higher profitability resulting from the shelter in the form of higher wages. This radical proposition, which became implemented throughout the labour market over subsequent decades, represented the conscious attempt to transfer via the industrial protection and wage setting systems the wealth that had accumulated from the previous century of commodity export abundance into well-paid urban industrial and service employment. The highest average incomes per capita in the world of 1900 were to be made into the egalitarian reality via state action. In addition, the emergent welfare system was tied to the employment system in what Castles rightly called the 'wage earners welfare state' (Castles 2002).

Together the two central institutions produced a system we can call labourist-protectionism (Lloyd, 2002, 2003) which became an all-encompassing, hegemonic, regime of economic and social development throughout the period until the crisis of the 1970s. This regime, a form of Social Democratic Welfare Capitalism, was explicitly designed by a loose coalition of Liberals and Labor as a developmental state response to the fundamental problems of diversification in a resource-dependent economy and the maintenance of the high standard of urbanized, middle class, living that had already developed in the second half of the 19^{th} Century on the basis of resource abundant exports, labour scarcity, and capital inflows. The regime suffered a crisis during the Great Depression but a combination of protectionism, imperial preference, and temporary wage suppression and, then, crucially, the Second World War, enabled the regime to not only survive but be further developed by the Labor Party government of 1941-49. The conservative governments of 1949-72 did not abandon the regime, for it produced political and social stability and had a powerful political path dependency. Successive resource export booms in the 1950s and 1960s enabled the redistribution system, via higher wages and full employment, to continue to maintain the 'suburban dream'.

The other central institution invented in the early 20th Century was, of course, federation. But the federal system struggled in the early years to come to terms with fiscal federalism for the founders had not envisaged the central government being stronger than the states. The weakness of the centre threatened to destroy the federation because of states' rights and states' discontent. Unequal development and finance were the key problems. But solutions were found because the federal constitution was able to be subverted due to its complexity and sometimes contradictory provisions, despite the almost impossibility of revising it. The federal state was stabilized through key institutional developments in the late 1920s to 1940s era that consolidated the central fiscal authority and enabled horizontal fiscal equalization among the states while allowing vertical fiscal inequality.[19] The states

---

[19] The Financial Agreement of 1927 with the Loans Council centralised and regulated public borrowing, the 1933 Commonwealth Grants Commission guaranteed horizontal fiscal equalization, the Commonwealth Bank took on growing central banking powers from the late 1920s, the federal government became fiscally dominant with the uniform income tax of 1942, and in 1945 the CB became a fully fledged central bank.

have gradually become mere expenditure agents of the Commonwealth Treasury. The achievement of horizontal fiscal equality through the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) was a crucial aspect of the stable development state structure that was designed to spread the wealth from the booming export sectors. Later in the 20th Century the poorer states have themselves experienced resource abundance and some of their wealth has been redistributed via the CGC process.

The current crisis of the Eurozone shows what can happen when there is the absence of a developmental state. Europe introduced a common currency without the institutional framework of a centralized federal state that could regulate the economic behavior and introduce stable growth policies in the regions (states or nations) within the union. The 10-year failure of institution and policy development leading up to the crisis of 2010-2011, during which the EU papered over the lack of central authority to go with the common currency (with the important exception of the ECB) has now exposed the significance of developmental state power to go with a common currency. Other federations, including the US and Australia, had to learn this important lesson in their early history when implementing a new central system of currency with an emerging centralized monetary, fiscal, and development management system. In Australia' case there were stumbling steps along the way but by the late 1920s the centralized framework of a stronger federal state began to emerge and by the early 1940s the whole structure of essential central control was in place with monetary and fiscal policy then more or less taken out of the hands of the states, which were and continue to be fiscally irresponsible, being much more prey to rent seeking and pork barreling than the federal government.

In two fundamental respects the labourist-protectionist system must be considered a success – industrialization and socio-political stability. Australia achieved full industrialization in the sense of sectoral shares of the domestic economy by the 1960s when the manufacturing sector reached about 28-30 % of GDP and the growth rate of the sector outstripped the rest of the economy in the postwar years. (Attard 2010) Protection succeeded in the sense of industrial promotion of a full range of manufacturing, including a substantial motor vehicle industry.

By the 1970s the Labourist-Protectionism system was in crisis due to slow growth, stagflation, and some Dutch Disease effects from the new boom of the minerals and energy export sector. [20] Ad hoc arrangements to maintain the system failed and the hoped for 'rescue' of a new resource boom in the early 1980s also failed (the 'lucky country syndrome again) with the plunge into a severe recession in the early 1980s. The election of the Hawke/Keating government in 1983 saw the beginnings of the abandonment of the Labourist-Protectionist system to be replaced over the next decade by a neo-liberal regime.

Commodity Dependence, Political Economy, and Quality of Life in the 21st Century: From Unbalanced Development to a Balanced Outcome

Australia shared in the long boom of the 1992-2008 era with a rising standard of living, achieving near (official) full employment and continual growth. By 2005 all public debt had been eliminated and Australia became a creditor nation. Commodity exports dominated the export profile on the eve of the financial crisis (Figure 2) and since then the commodity-dependence has actually increased, thanks to the Chinese demand for raw materials (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 2 (Source: DFAT 2008)



[20] The 1965-75 decade witnessed a massive increase in minerals and energy exports from under 10% to over 50% of exports.

Australia is now clearly experiencing an increased commodity-dependence in terms of exports but not in terms of economic structure, although the characterization of the current situation as a 'boom' is problematic for the rate of economic growth is comparatively low and the shift in the export profile has not been of the dramatic order of 1965-75. Thus the question arises of whether Australia is experiencing now a form of resource curse? Very substantial currency appreciation is now impacting negatively on traditional exporting sectors (agriculture, notably the wine industry) and more so on import-competing manufacturing. On the other hand these are now so comparatively shrunken in sector shares of the total economy that the impact is much less than in earlier resource booms. The highly efficient agricultural sector employs almost nobody and, as with all mature economies, the services sector now employs 80% of the workforce and, with important exceptions, is not a highly trade-exposed sector. (see Fig 3) Even the booming mining sector employs only 2% of the workforce. Some parts of the services sector, notably higher education, one of the most dynamic and largest export sectors in recent decades, and tourism, have suffered from loss of international competitiveness through the exchange rate effect but these industries are not large employers. Figure 4 shows the shift in composition of exports in recent years.

These structural considerations go some of the way towards explaining the 'puzzle' of Australia's relatively slow growth in 2011 in the midst of a supposed resources boom. In their excellent new (November 2011) discussion of this phenomenon, Gregory and Sheehan (2011) argue that the free-market-driven rise in the exchange rate has had the effect of redistributing incomes towards households via lower import prices but that, on the other hand, the deleterious effect of traditional exporting and import-replacing sectors of agriculture, higher education, tourism, and manufacturing, has been significant but probably not producing a full-blown case of Dutch Disease.

FIGURE 3 (Source RBA 2011)



FIGURE 4 (Source: RBA 2011)



Australia in 2011 presents a mixed picture of a mature economy with an advanced, 'balanced' institutional structure very comparable with alike OECD countries, but again with an 'unbalanced' export profile. The trajectory of development over the past 120 years has been one of similarity to other countries that achieved development from a similar starting point in 'unbalanced' commodity dependence (Anglo settler societies and Nordic societies) but a contrast with those (Hispanic settler societies, especially) who did not make such a transformation for most of the 20th Century (especially the 1930s-1980s period). The inability to move towards a successful developmental state model after the early 20th Century seems to have been crucial there but in the 21st Century that now seems to be happening. It can be argued (Lloyd, 2012) that indeed the Anglo and Hispanic settler societies are actually on the same path of institutional development. That one is well ahead of the other does not mean that convergence is not happening. Good government, strong de facto civic participation, democracy, equality, welfare, and economic development seem to form an embedded structure of mutually reinforcing elements that are difficult to create but can emerge out of contingent historical experiences and institutional good fortune.

Works Referenced and Consulted

Abjorensen, N, 2011, 'The Corruption Pipeline', *Inside Story,* Melbourne, 10 November, 2011, http://inside.org.au/the-corruption-pipeline/

Acemoglu, D, Johnson, S, and Robinson, J A, 2001, 'The Colonial origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation', *The American Economic Review,* 91, 5, 1369-1401

Ahmed, N, Bucifal, S, George, T, 2008, 'An Analysis of the Relevance of the Resource Curse to Australia, and Policy Implications', Australian National University, SSRN Working Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492943

Attard, B 2010, 'The Economic History of Australia from 1788: An Introduction', *EH Net Encyclopedia,* http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/attard.australia

Australian Treasury, 2011, 'Budget Strategy and Outlook 2011-2012 – Budget Paper No 1 – Statement 4: Opportunities and Challenges of an Economy in Transition', The Treasury, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.

Auty, R M (ed), 2001, *Resource Abundance and Economic Development,* Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Auty, R M, 2000, 'How Natural Resources Affect Economic Development', *Development Policy Review,* 18, 4, 347-364

Auty, R M, 2001, 'The Political Economy of Resource-Driven Growth', *European Economic Review,* 45, 839-846.

Banks, G, 2011, 'Australia's Mining Boom: What's the Problem? Address to Melbourne Institute and the Australian Economic and Social Outlook Conference, mimeo, 30 June, 2011.

Barbier, E B, 2011, *Scarcity and Frontiers: How Economies Have Developed Through Natural Resource Exploitation,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Battelino, R, 2010, 'Economic Developments', *Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin*, December Quarter 2010.

Bloxham, P, 2011, *Does Australia Have a Resources Curse? The Challenges of Managing a Mining Boom,* Australia Economics: HSBC Global Research, August 2011, Sydney.

Bulte, E H, Damania, R, Deacon, R T, 2005, 'Resource Intensity, Institutions, and Development', *World Development,* 33, 1029-1044.

Cárdenas, M, Ramirez, S, Tuzemen, D, 2011, 'Commodity Dependence and Fiscal Capacity', *Latin America Initiative at Brookings*, April 1, 2011, The Brookings Institution, Washington.

Carmignani, F and Avom, D, 2010, 'The Social Development Effects of Primary Commodity Export Dependence', *Ecological Economics,* 70, 317-330.

Castles, F. G. 2002, 'Australia's Institutions and Australia's Welfare', in Brennan, G. and Castles, F. G. (eds) *Australia Reshaped: 200 Years of Institutional Transformation,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Cleary, P, 2011, *Too Much Luck: The Mining Boom and Australia's Future,* Black Inc, Melbourne.

Collier, P, 2002, 'Primary Commodity Dependence and Africa's Future, *The World Bank,* April 2002.
Conley, T, 2011, 'Structural Shenanighans in the Australian Economy', *Australian Policy Online, August 2011.*
Connolly, E and Orsmond, D, 2011, The Mining Industry: From Bust to Boom', *Reserve Bank of Australia Conference on Australia in the 2000s,* Sydney. http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2011/connolly-and-orsmond.pdf
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australian Government), 2008, *Australia in Brief,* DFAT, Canberra. http://www.dfat.gov.au/aib/trade_investment.html
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australian Government), 2011, *Trade at a Glance 2011,* DFAT, Canberra.
Di Marco, Pirie, M, and Wilson, A-Y, 2009, 'A History of Public Debt in Australia', *The Commonwealth Treasury: Documents*, 12 June, 2009, Canberra. www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1496/PDF/01_Debt.pdf
Easterly, W and Levine, R, 2003, 'Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development', *Journal of Monetary Economics,* 50, 3-39.
Economist, The, 2010, 'It's Only Natural', *The Economist*, London, Sep 9th, 2010
Engerman, S and Sokoloff, K, 2002, 'Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies', *NBER Working Paper 9259,* National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA.
Farfan, O H, 2005, 'Understanding and Escaping Commodity-Dependency: A Global Value Chain Perspective', *Investment Climate Unit, International Finance Corporation*, October 2005, The World Bank, Washington.
Frankel, J, 2010, 'The Natural Resource Curse; A Survey', *Faculty Research Working Paper RWP 10-005,* Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge MA.
Gittins, R, 2011, 'It May be a Two-Speed Economy but we all Share the Dividends', *Sydney Morning Herald,* 9 November, 2011.
Goodman, J and Worth, D, 2009, 'The Mineral's Boom and Australia's Resource Curse', *Journal of Australian Political Economy,* 61, 201-219.
Gregory, B and Sheehan, P, 2011, *The Resources Boom and Macroeconomic Policy in Australia,* Australian Economic Report: Number 1, Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University, Melbourne.
Havro, G and Santiso, J, 2008, 'The Curse of Raw Materials?', *Policy Insights No 75,* OECD Development Centre, OECD, Paris.
HDI, 2011, *Human Development Report 2011,* UNDP, New York.
Hirschman, A 1958, *The Strategy of Economic Development,* Yale University Press, New Haven.
Horne, D, 1964, *The Lucky Country,* Penguin Books, Melbourne.
Horne, D, 2004, 'Still Lucky but Getting Smarter', *The Age,* August 28, 2004, Melbourne.
http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/en/index.htm
Innis, H, 1930, *The Fur Trade in Canada,* Yale University Press, New Haven.
Isham, J, Woolcock, M, Pritchett, L, Busby, G, 2005, 'The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth', *World Bank Economic Review,* 19, 2, 141-174.
Kearns, J and Lowe, P, 2011, Australia's Prosperous 2000s: Housing and the Mining Boom' *Reserve Bank of Australia Conference on Australia in the 2000s,* Sydney. http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2011/kearns.pdf

Krugman, P, 1991, 'Increasing Returns and Economic Geography', *Journal of Political Economy*, 99, 3, 483-499.

Krugman, P, 1994, 'The Rise and Fall of Development Economics', *Rethinking the Development Experience: Essays Provoked by the Work of Albert O Hirschman,* The Brookings Institution, Washington.

Larsen, E R, 2004, 'Escaping the Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease: When and Why Norway Caught up With and Forged Ahead of it Neighbours', *Discussion Paper 377, Statistics Norway, Research Department,* Kongsvinger, Norway.

Lloyd, C, 2002, Regime Change in Australian Capitalism: Towards a Historical Political Economy of Regulation' *Australian Economic History Review,* 42, 3, pp 238-266.

Lloyd, C 2003, 'Economic Policy and Australian State-Building: From Labourist-Protectionism to Globalisation' in A. Teichova and H. Matis (eds) *Nation, State, and the Economy in History,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Lloyd, C, 2011, 'The History and Future of Social Democratic Welfare Capitalism: From Modernization to the Spectres of Ultramodernity,' in P Kettunen and K Petersen (eds) *Beyond Welfare State Models,* Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

Lloyd, C, 2012, 'Institutional Patterns of the Settler Societies: Hybrid, Parallel, Convergent', in Lloyd, C, Metzer, J, and Sutch, R, *Settler Economies in World History,* forthcoming from Brill.

McMichael, P, l984, *Settlers and the Agrarian Question*; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Mehlum, H, Moene, K, Torvik, R, 2006, 'Institutions and the Resource Curse', *The Economic Journal,* 116, 1-20.

Meyer, D R, (2010) 'The Roots of American Industrialization, 1790-1860', *Encyclopedia of Economic History,* EH Net, Economic History Association. eh.net/encyclopedia/article/meyer.industrialization

Moore, B, 1966, *The Social Origins of Dictatorships and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World,* Beacon Press, Boston.

OECD, 2011, *How's Life: Measuring Well-Being,* OECD, Paris.

Paldam, M and Gundlach, E, 2008, 'Two Views on Institutions and Development', *Kyklos,* 61, 65-100.

Polanyi, K, 1944, *The Great Transformation*, Reinhart and Co, New York.

Polanyi, K, 1977, *The Livelihood of Man,* (ed H W Pearson) Academic Press, New York.

RBA (Reserve Bank of Australia) 2011, *Chart Pack 2011,* Sydney http://www.rba.gov.au/chart-pack/pdf/chart-pack.pdf

Reeves, W.P. (1902) *State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand, 2 Vols,* Grant Richards, London.

Reisen, H, 2008, 'How to Spend it: Commodity and Non-Commodity Sovereign Wealth Funds', *OECD Development Centre Policy Brief No 38,* OECD, Paris.

Richardson, D and Denniss, R, 2011, 'Mining the Truth: The Rhetoric and Reality of the Commodities Boom', *The Australia Institute Paper No 7,* The Australia Institute, Canberra.

Robertson, P L, 2008, Resource Based or Resource Cursed? A Brief (and Selective) History of the Australian Economy Since 1901' *AIRC Working Paper 0108, Australian Innovation Research Centre*, Hobart.

Robinson, J A, 2009, 'Botswana as a Role Model for Country Success', *WIDER Research Paper 2009/40,* UNU-WIDER, Helsinki.

Robinson, J A, Torvik, R, Verdier, T, 2006, 'Political Foundations of the Resource Curse', *Journal of Development Economics,* 79, 447-468.
Ross, M, 1999, 'The Political Economy of the Resource Curse', *World Politics,* Vol 51, 297-322.
Sachs, J D and Warner, A M, 1995, 'Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth', NBER Working Paper No 5398.
Sachs, J D and Warner, A M, 2001, 'The Curse of Natural Resources', *European Economic Review,* 45, 827-838.
Semmel, B, 1961, 'The Philosophic Radicals and Colonialism', *Journal of Economic History,* Vol 21, No 4, 513-525.
Sen, A 1999, *Development as Freedom,* Alfred A Knopf, New York.
Siegel, M, 2011, 'A Dark Side Surfaces in Australia's Mining Boom', *International Herald Tribune, June 1, 2011, p17.*
Stevens, G, 2010, 'The Challenge of Prosperity', *Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin*, December Quarter, 2010.
Stiglitz, J, Sen, A, Fitoussi, J-P, 2009, *Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress*, Paris.
Willis, R P and Murray, W E, 2010, 'Breaking the Resource Curse: The Cases of New Zealand and Australia', *Australian Studies, (National Library of Australia),* Vol 2.
Wright, G and Czelusta, J, 2004, 'The Myth of the Resource Curse', *Challenge, Vol 47, No 2, March/April 2004.*